Globalization: Lands of Milk & Money

Lands of Milk & Money
American and European Dairy Protection Under the World Trade Organization
By Emily Bleimund (Progressive Policy Institute)

Introduction

December's World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Hong Kong gave America and the other 148 WTO members one year to agree on a sweeping reform of world trade policy and bring the "Doha Round" to a successful completion. If successful, it would be the first WTO agreement since the late 1990s, and the first comprehensive trade agreement since 1994.

At its heart is a reshaping of agricultural trade. The WTO's developing countries, for whom agriculture represents a substantial share of the economy, argue that their farmers face unfair competitive disadvantages in global markets because of the economic supports that rich countries shower on their farmers. American farmers benefit from exports as well, yet the United States is also under scrutiny as the world's third-biggest spender on farm supports. Successful conclusion of the Doha Round would mean significant reductions in these supports, as well as more open markets. On those grounds, Americans guiding farm and trade policy may find it tempting to assume a defensive posture in the coming year. They should instead seize the opportunity to work together with other countries and sharply reduce farm subsidy programs. That would serve three very important goals:

* First, due to the U.S. farm sector's enormous productive capacity and the fact that EU and Japanese support programs are larger than Americas, a multilateral trade agreement could open the door to new export opportunities while simultaneously focusing our farmers on new innovation and efficiency gains that will further bolster their comparative advantages;

* Second, lowering U.S. spending on farm subsidy programs will present a much-needed opportunity to whittle billions of dollars from our steadily rising federal budget deficit;

* Third, multilateral trade reforms that include farm subsidy cuts by the United States and other rich nations (particularly the European Union and Japan) will spur economic development and help alleviate poverty in underdeveloped countries, to the ultimate benefit of the global economy.

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Manual de tácticas usadas por Estados Unidos para ablandar a Colombia en la negociación del TLC

(Articulo publicado en el diario Colombiano El TIEMPO), con motivo del demorado proceso de firma de un TLC con USA. Los colombianos, inteligentemente, se niegan a firmar "cualquier" tratado, y saben que no firmarlo, muchas veces puede ser mejor que firmar un tratado desastroso para su desarrollo.

Manual de tácticas usadas por Estados Unidos para ablandar a Colombia en la negociación del TLC

Han usado de todo: el perfil rudo, hacerse el despistado, burlarse de la contraparte. Hasta una pasada por la peluquería se vale.

Este último caso se presentó el lunes pasado, cuando los negociadores colombianos del tema agropecuario llegaron a su cita de las 10 de la mañana, decididos a iniciar la ronda definitiva.

Pero la coordinadora estadounidense de dicho tema, Mary Latimer, les comunicó la decisión de aplazar el inicio de la tanda de negociaciones. “Iba para la peluquería” y no alcanzaba a llegar a la hora prevista.

Les dijeron que volvieran a la una, pero tampoco los atendieron. Y los encuentros empezaron un día después.

Durante 20 meses los negociadores colombianos del Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) han vivido situaciones como esta. Ninguno habla de los casos que ha tenido que ‘aguantar’ personalmente, pero en las rondas se han conocido detalles que muestran el talante expuesto por los negociadores de Estados Unidos.

Latimer se lleva el primer lugar en ‘rudeza’. A lo largo de casi dos años ha expuesto una amplia gama de recursos para decir no. Su actitud es bien conocida por negociadores de otros países que han tenido que enfrentarla, particularmente los de Centroamérica, Chile y Panamá.

Una categoría distinta a los rudos es la de los desconcentrados. Aquí clasifican los negociadores estadounidenses de propiedad intelectual y de asuntos fitosanitarios. En ambos temas, luego de repasar y escuchar las posiciones colombianas en reuniones anteriores, llegaban a una nueva ronda pidiendo ‘comenzar por el principio’ o desconociendo lo avanzado.

Algunos empresarios interpretaron este tipo de señales como una forma contundente de ‘poner a sufrir’ a la contraparte para menoscabar su ánimo y llevarlo hasta el límite.

Y la gama de recursos es tan amplia como la imaginación: entre los participantes del cuarto de al lado se relata el caso en el que quisieron hacerles una mala pasada a los integrantes de otra de las mesas que se negocian.

El equipo colombiano fue citado a reunión en un edificio en donde el cuarto asignado era el más lejano en las instalaciones, y tenía todas las condiciones para hacerlo poco hospitalario: era frío, sólo había unas cuantas sillas, mesa, computador y un teléfono.

Los negociadores tuvieron que esperar largas horas sin que su contraparte se apareciera pero encontraron la forma de trabajar a través del teléfono y el computador. Al día siguiente no había teléfono y tuvieron que conformarse con hacer todo a través del computador. Al tercer día, tampoco había computador.

Lo único constante durante los primeros días de sesiones fue la espera de horas hasta que su contraparte apareciera. En esas largas esperas, combatían el aburrimiento bebiendo agua y café, que encontraban luego de hacer un largo recorrido. Al cabo de unos días el paseo les resultó entretenido y por eso su actitud jovial dejó desconcertados a los estadounidenses, quienes finalmente cumplieron con sus citas.

Otra historia que se destaca en la colección de leyendas del TLC es la de un negociador joven que, además, luce aún más joven de lo que es. Antes de que fuera a intervenir en las discusiones los norteamericanos pedían “que hable el niño”. Y junto a los comentarios despectivos sobre su supuesta ‘inmadurez’, otro miembro del equipo colombiano recibió por respuesta comentarios sobre su posible ‘locura’ al hacer peticiones que se alejaban de la realidad.

Edilma Pereira, Enviada especial. Washington (E.U.)

Perfil negociador

¿Cuál es el método óptimo o la vía más expedita para una negociación? al respecto se han escrito cientos de libros en los que se pueden encontrar numerosas maneras de encarar estos procesos. Algunos de los caminos sugeridos son:

* Ponerse duro para vencer al contrincante, una visión tradicional.
* Confundir al oponente durante todo el proceso para sacar el mejor provecho, una visión alternativa.
* Buscar el ‘gana-gana’ en el que todos queden contentos. Una teoría más reciente.
* Una técnica ‘suave’ puede dar mejores resultados que las agresivas. Una visión heterodoxa.

Durante 20 meses de negociaciones del TLC, el equipo colombiano ha probado una buena gama de tácticas de su contraparte estadounidense. En general, hasta el momento, no son ‘suaves’ ni ‘gana-gana’. Con la experiencia de varios tratados en la última década, ponen el texto básico y sobre él se van haciendo las variaciones que las partes vayan aceptando.

Globalization focus shifts from costs to customers

Hemos quedado afuera, aún con salarios bajos, no podemos competir con China, India, Brasil o Rusia.
Cual es la estrategia de Argentina hoy?

Globalization focus shifts from costs to customers
By Ben Hirschler (Reuters)

DAVOS, Switzerland (Reuters) - The world's business leaders are more wedded to globalization than ever as their attention switches from cutting costs to winning new customers, according to research released on Wednesday.

The emergence of economic powerhouses like China and India is a major theme of this week's World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, which brings together the world's business and political elite.

A PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis of responses from 1,410 chief executives found 63 percent were confident globalization would have a positive impact on their businesses over the next three years.

Overall, 71 percent expected to do business in China, India, Brazil or Russia over that period, with 78 percent viewing China as the most significant market opportunity.

The survey underlines how corporate objectives and attitudes have shifted as key emerging markets have started to mature, generating a growing middle class with the money and inclination to buy Western goods and services.

"Cutting costs is no longer the sole purpose for globalization," said PwC chief executive Samuel DiPiazza.

"The economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and, of course, China were once seen primarily as sources of low-cost production.

"However, they now present substantial growth opportunities for both multinational and locally-based companies, and at the same time are producing a new crop of serious global competitors."

That view was echoed by a smaller survey of 200 executives from Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, which found 58 percent of manufacturers expected their company's revenues to grow substantially in emerging markets over the next three years.

Only 23 percent of the same group were as optimistic about prospects in developed markets.

When it comes to achieving their goals for global expansion, executives have a number of favored strategic options.

Forming alliances with partners tops the list, followed by opening new offices, developing unique products, outsourcing, and mergers and acquisitions.

The biggest single obstacle to globalization was considered to be over-regulation, cited by 64 percent of respondents in the PwC survey, with trade barriers coming a close second.

The threat of terrorism and protests by the anti-globalization movement -- evident again at last month's world trade talks in Hong Kong -- come bottom of the list of perceived threats, mentioned by only 48 and 21 percent of CEOs respectively.


Reuters Business Channel | Reuters.com

La globalización no es ni buena ni mala. Depende de cómo se la aproveche

Lo que sigue, es una transcripción parcial de una muy interesante entrevista que La Nación le hizo a Daniel Zovatto, reconocido politicólogo argentino.

...viene del artículo completo
-Y desaprovechamos algunos beneficios de la globalización.

-Hay que tomar conciencia de que en el actual contexto de globalización no hay tiempo que perder. Debemos sacudirnos la miopía estratégica y el cortoplacismo. En primer lugar, la Argentina debe dejar atrás, definitivamente, tres maldiciones que la persiguen desde hace muchos años: tratar de refundar el país desde cero, cada cierto numero de años; creer en los "milagros", es decir en los cambios sin esfuerzos, y tercero, la montaña rusa, caracterizada en lo económico por la secuencia crisis-reactivación-estancamiento y, en lo social y político, por el ciclo ilusión-desencanto-bronca.

-Por momentos, en la Argentina avanza la creencia de que la globalización es negativa.

-La globalización no es ni buena ni mala. Depende de cómo se la aproveche. Para los países de Asia del Este, que la han adoptado a su propio ritmo, con sus propias reglas y condiciones, significó un beneficio muy grande. Por el contrario, en la Argentina y la gran mayoría de los países de América latina produjo efectos muy graves.

-Lo difícil es cómo cabalgar la ola.

-Existe hoy un debate muy intenso al respecto. Thomas Friedman, corresponsal de temas internacionales de The New York Times, en su reciente libro The World is Flat: a Brief History of the 21st Century (El mundo es plano, una breve historia del siglo XXI), afirma que la tecnología está "aplanando" al mundo. Para Friedman, el inicio del siglo XXI no sólo será recordado por conflictos militares o acontecimientos políticos, sino por un "aplanamiento del mundo". Todo se parecerá, vaticina, a Silicon Valley o Bangalore (India), lleno de ingenieros informáticos. Uno, gracias a la fibra óptica, puede innovar sin necesidad de emigrar. La fuerza impulsora hoy son los individuos, no los Estados ni las multinacionales, como en el pasado.

-Pero Friedman es criticado.

-Sí, porque su interpretación es monocausal. Además, ignora la importante y persistente gravitación de factores como religión y nacionalismo. Entre los principales críticos está el analista Richard Florida, quien en su artículo The World is Spiky (El mundo tiene un perfil aserrado) sostiene que si bien la globalización ha alterado el campo de juego económico, lo cierto es que lo ha vuelto más concentrado. Para este autor, la característica de nuestro tiempo no es un mundo más nivelado, sino uno "lleno de picos" (spiky), en el cual vemos un aumento de las tendencias que dividen a los países pobres de los países ricos. Y para demostrarlo, Florida analiza cuatro dimensiones: la concentración de la población en las ciudades; la concentración de la actividad económica en ciertas ciudades; el número de patentes (como medición de la innovación), y el número de citas científicas.

-Florida explica que hay tres tipos de lugares económicos.

-Sí. Los "picos" económicos, es decir unas muy pocas y casi insuperables ciudades, que generan innovaciones, que tienen la capacidad de atraer talentos de todas partes del mundo, crear productos y dar origen a industrias novedosas; las "colinas" económicas, ciudades que fabrican los bienes consolidados del mundo, atienden sus llamadas telefónicas y sirven de apoyo a sus motores de innovación, zonas que están sujetas a rápidos altibajos, son prósperas, pero también inseguras, y los vastos "valles", es decir, los lugares escasamente conectados a la economía globalizada y con pocos prospectos inmediatos, como América latina.

-Inquietante teoría.

-Según Florida, el dominio de las urbes más productivas, de los "picos" es pasmoso. En producción económica, las diez áreas metropolitanas más importantes de Estados Unidos combinadas están sólo por debajo de ese país en su conjunto y de Japón. La economía de Nueva York es casi del tamaño de la de Rusia o de Brasil, y la de Chicago está a la par de la de Suecia. Juntas, las economías de Nueva York, Los Angeles, Chicago y Boston son más grandes que la de China. Si las áreas metropolitanas estadounidenses fuesen países conformarían el 47% de las cien economías más importantes del mundo. Con la concentración de las patentes ocurre otro tanto. De las 300.000 patentes de inventores residentes en más de cien naciones registradas en 2002, dos terceras partes se otorgaron a estadounidenses o japoneses, y el 85% a residentes en sólo cinco países (Japón, Estados Unidos, Corea del Sur, Alemania y Rusia). El resto del mundo registró apenas un 5%. Hoy, más de sesenta estados (casi un tercio del total mundial) son considerados "estados fallidos", según un reciente estudio del Carnegie Endowment for Peace, casi una docena de los cuales (a mi juicio, de manera exagerada e incorrecta) son latinoamericanos. Si América latina no cambia de posición, se agravará la desigualdad y la inseguridad. Según un estudio del BID, en la región cada año son asesinadas 140.000 personas. Nuestra región es la más violenta del mundo con una media de 25,1 homicidios por cada 100.000 habitantes, muy superior a la media mundial (8,8), e incluso más alta que la de Africa (22,2).

-¿Cómo debe obrar la Argentina?

-Se debe crear un Estado fuerte y mejorar su capacidad de gestión; debe devolverse contenido y centralidad a la política, fortaleciendo los partidos (no la partidocracia) y mejorando la calidad del liderazgo; fortalecer la calidad institucional, el imperio de la ley y la lucha contra la corrupción. Ojalá el presidente Kirchner, aprovechando el buen momento económico, en lugar de buscar su reelección se decida a invertir toda su energía, su capital político y su alto nivel de apoyo público en convocar un acuerdo nacional que sirva de sustento a una visión de país de mediano y largo plazo. Así adquiriría la estatura de estadista.

Game Theory, Rational Egoism and the Evolution of Fairness

Is it rational to be ethical? Many philosophers have wrestled with this most fundamental of questions, attempting to clarify whether humans are well served by ethical rules or whether they weigh us down. Would we really be better off if we all gave in to the desire to just watch out for our own interests and take the greatest advantage to ourselves whenever we can? Ayn Rand, for one, thought that the only rational behavior is egoism, and books aiming at increasing personal wealth (presumably at the expense of someone else’s wealth) regularly make the bestsellers list.

Plato, Kant, and John Stuart Mill, to mention a few, have tried to show that there is more to life than selfishness. In the Republic, Plato has Socrates defending his philosophy against the claim that justice and fairness are only whatever rich and powerful people decide they are. But the arguments of his opponents—that we can see plenty of examples of unjust people who have a great life and of just ones who suffer in equally great manner—seem more convincing than the high-mindedness of the father of philosophy.

Kant attempted to reject what he saw as the nihilistic attitude of Christianity, where you are good now because you will get an infinite payoff later, and to establish independent rational foundations for morality. Therefore he suggested that in order to decide if something is ethical or not one has to ask what would happen if everybody were adopting the same behavior. However, Kant never explained why his version of rational ethics is indeed rational. Rand would object that establishing double standards, one for yourself and one for the rest of the universe, makes perfect sense.

Mill also tried to establish ethics on firm rational foundations, in his case improving on Jeremy Bentham’s idea of utilitarianism. In chapter two of his book Utilitarianism, Mill writes: “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” Leaving aside the thorny question of what happiness is and the difficulty of actually making such calculations, one still has to answer the fundamental question of why one should care about increasing the average degree of happiness instead of just one’s own.

Things got worse with the advent of modern evolutionary biology. It seemed for a long time that Darwin’s theory would provide the naturalistic basis for the ultimate selfish universe: nature red in tooth and claw evokes images of “every man for himself,” in pure Randian style. In fact, Herbert Spencer popularized the infamous doctrine of “Social Darwinism” (which Darwin never espoused) well before Ayn Rand wrote Atlas Shrugged.

Recently, however, several scientists and philosophers have been taking a second look at evolutionary theory and its relationship with ethics, and are finding new ways of realizing the project of Plato, Kant, and Mill of deriving a fundamentally rational way of being ethical. Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson, in their Unto Others: the Psychology and Evolution of Unselfish Behavior, as well as Peter Singer in A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution and Cooperation, argue that human beings evolved as social animals, not as lone, self-reliant brutes. In a society, cooperative behavior (or at least, a balance between cooperation and selfishness) will be selected in favor, while looking out exclusively for number one will be ostracized because it reduces the fitness of most individuals and of the group as a whole.

All of this sounds good, but does it actually work? A recent study published in Science by Martin Nowak, Karen Page and Karl Sigmund provides a splendid example of how mathematical evolutionary theory can be applied to ethics, and how in fact social evolution favors fair and cooperative behavior. Nowak and coworkers tackled the problem posed by the so-called “ultimatum game.” In it, two players are offered the possibility of winning a pot of money, but they have to agree on how to divide it. One of the players, the proposer, makes an offer of a split ($90 for me, $10 for you, for example) to the other player; the other player, the responder, has the option of accepting or rejecting. If she rejects, the game is over and neither of them gets any money.

It is easy to demonstrate that the rational strategy is for the proposer to behave egotistically and to suggest a highly uneven split in which she takes most of the money, and for the responder to accept. The alternative is that neither of them gets anything. However, when real human beings from a variety of cultures and using a panoply of rewards play the game the outcome is invariably a fair share of the prize. This would seem prima facie evidence that the human sense of fair play overwhelms mere rationality and thwarts the rationalistic prediction. On the other hand, it would also provide Ayn Rand with an argument that most humans are simply stupid, because they don’t appreciate the math behind the game.

Nowak and colleagues, however, simulated the evolution of the game in a situation in which several players get to interact repeatedly. That is, they considered a social situation rather than isolated encounters. If the players have memory of previous encounters (i.e., each player builds a “reputation” in the group), then the winning strategy is to be fair because people are willing to punish dishonest proposers, which increases their own reputation for fairness and damages the proposer’s reputation for the next round. This means that—given the social environment—it is rational to be less selfish toward your neighbors.

While we are certainly far from a satisfying mathematical and evolutionary theory of morality, it seems that science does, after all, have something to say about optimal ethical rules. And the emerging picture is one of fairness—not egotism—as the smart choice to make.

Reforming the United Nations

Economist.com | Reforming the UN: "

Towards a more relevant United Nations

Dec 1st 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda

Long-awaited proposals on reforming the United Nations have been unveiled. Backers hope they will rejuvenate the world body. But they come at a time when the UN is under fire—especially from Americans, many of whom think it is irrelevant and corrupt



CRITICS and supporters of the United Nations have sometimes seemed worlds apart. But since last year, almost all of them, whether multilateralist or unilateralist, American or European, have come to agree that the organisation is in crisis. This week, a blue-ribbon panel commissioned by the body’s secretary-general, Kofi Annan, released its report on what to do about it.

The UN’s sorry state became most obvious with the Iraq war. Those favouring the war were furious that after a decade of Security Council resolutions, including the last-chance Resolution 1441 threatening “serious consequences” if Iraq did not prove its disarmament, the UN could not agree to act. Anti-war types were just as frustrated that the world body failed to stop the war. But Iraq was not the UN’s only problem. It has done little to stop humanitarian disasters, such as the ongoing horror in Sudan. And it has done nothing to stop Iran’s and North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Recognising the danger of irrelevance, Mr Annan last year told a 16-member panel, composed mainly of former government ministers and heads of government, to suggest changes. These fall broadly into two categories: the institutional and the cultural. The former has got most of the headlines—particularly a call for changing the structure of the Security Council. But changes in the UN’s working practices are crucial too.

Everyone agrees that the Security Council is an unrepresentative relic: of its 15 seats, five are occupied by permanent, veto-wielding members (America, Russia, China, Britain and France) and ten go to countries that rotate every two years and have no veto. But that the council’s composition is a throwback to the world order immediately after the second world war has been agreed on for decades, without any success in changing it. Japan and Germany, the second- and third-biggest contributors to the UN budget, believe they are entitled to permanent seats. So does India, the world’s second-most-populous country, and Brazil, Latin America’s biggest. Unlike in previous efforts, these four have finally banded together to press their case. And they are joined in spirit by the Africans, who want two seats for their continent.

But each aspirant has opponents. China mistrusts Japan. Italy opposes a permanent seat for Germany, which would make Italy the only biggish European power without one. (It instead proposes a single seat for the European Union, a non-starter since this would require Britain and France to give up theirs, and regional institutions cannot be UN members under the current UN Charter.) Spanish-speaking Mexico and Argentina do not think Portuguese-speaking Brazil should represent Latin America, and Pakistan strongly opposes its rival India’s bid. As for potential African seats, Egypt claims one as the representative of the Muslim and Arab world. That would leave Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country, and South Africa, which is richer and a more stable democracy, fighting for the other.

The panel has proposed two alternatives. The first would give six countries (none is named but probably Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and two African countries) permanent seats without a veto, and create three extra non-permanent seats, bringing the total number of council members to 24. The second, which would expand the council by the same number of seats, creates a new middle tier of members who would serve for four years and could be immediately re-elected, above the current lower tier of two-year members, who cannot be re-elected. The rivals to the would-be permanent members favour this option.

While Security Council reform may be the most visible of the proposals, the panel has also shared its views on the guidelines on when members may use force legally. Under the UN Charter, they can do so in two circumstances only: Article 51 allows force in a clear case of self-defence, and Chapter VII permits its use when the Security Council agrees. While the panellists have not proposed major changes to these two parts of the Charter, they have offered refinements.

Though the Charter was written to govern war between countries, the panel argues that even without revision, Chapter VII lets the Security Council authorise force for more controversial, modern reasons like fighting terrorists and intervention in states committing humanitarian horrors. It even considers “preventive” wars against serious but non-imminent threats potentially justifiable.

But the panel also says any decision to use force must pass five tests: the threat must be grave; the primary purpose must be to avert the threat; force must be a last resort; means must be proportional; and there must be a reasonable chance that force will succeed without calamitous consequences. All common-sense stuff, but the panel proposes making these tests explicit (if subjective and unofficial), thus raising the quality of debate about any decision to go to war.

On top of this, the report urges the UN to make better use of its assets in the fight against terrorism. One of the obstacles to an effective counter-terrorism strategy has been UN members’ inability to agree on a definition of terrorism. The panel tries to help by defining it as “any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants”; Arab countries may continue to press for exemptions in the case of “foreign occupation”. The report also deals with what it sees as a possible “cascade of nuclear proliferation” in the near future. It recommends creating more incentives for countries to stop enriching uranium.

Oil-for-food: scheme or scam?

The UN has enough to worry about with its perceived impotence in the run-up to the Iraq war. But since the war, it has been dogged by accusations of corruption too. Before the American-led invasion, it administered a $62 billion “oil-for-food” programme that allowed Iraq to sell oil to pay for humanitarian goods. Since the war, documents have surfaced that seem to show that Saddam Hussein gamed the system to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. Some money he siphoned directly. But he may also have bought political support from well-placed people in western governments and, damningly, the UN itself.

Benon Sevan, the former head of the oil-for-food programme, has appeared on a list of those who allegedly took oil vouchers from Saddam. But even closer to the top, perhaps, is the case of Kojo Annan. The secretary-general’s son worked for a Swiss firm, Cotecna, that inspects goods at border-crossings. He left the firm in December 1998, just before it won a contract to work in the oil-for-food programme. Last week, the New York Sun reported that the young Mr Annan had continued to receive payments from Cotecna until 2004. These were part of a standard non-compete agreement, the secretary-general’s office has said. But the duration of the payments was kept hidden from investigators in the now-irate American Congress. Mr Annan senior claims he did not know the payments had gone on so long, and conceded that his son’s less-than-full disclosure had created a “perception problem”.

Earlier this year, Mr Annan commissioned an investigation into oil-for-food, headed by Paul Volcker, a former head of America’s Federal Reserve. But Congress is running its own parallel investigations, and demanding that Mr Volcker share his information. Mr Volcker has refused, saying it would hamper his own work. Conservative commentators and critics of the UN say Mr Annan is hiding behind Mr Volcker’s investigation, and are smelling blood. There have been calls for Mr Annan to resign.

In this environment, the prospects for UN reform are clouded. Structural changes like those in the report require the backing of two-thirds of the delegates in the General Assembly, further ratification by two-thirds of the governments at home, and no veto by the Security Council’s permanent members. America is in a foul mood about the world body. Why bother reforming something hopelessly ineffective and even corrupt, many there ask? Despite universal agreement that the UN is in a bad way, the case for reform faces an uphill struggle.

The world on his desk (Bush´s)

Economist.com

By invitation: Richard Haass
The world on his desk

Nov 4th 2004 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition

A briefing for the weary winner from the man in charge of policy and planning at the State Department in 2001-03

AS GEORGE BUSH contemplates his second term, he faces far more challenges, and more difficult ones, than he did four years ago. The first reason for this is the objective state of the world, with a host of problems, from Iraq to North Korea to HIV/AIDS, demanding urgent attention. The second is the current condition of the United States. America remains the world's pre-eminent actor, but it is also stretched militarily, in debt financially, divided domestically and unpopular internationally. It all makes one wonder why Mr Bush seemed so keen to keep the job.

The United States is engaged in at least three conflicts. First, terrorism. Although al-Qaeda's original membership may be diminished, some of its leaders (including Osama bin Laden himself) remain at large and many have joined them. Mr Bush may find himself dealing with groups that possess not just box-cutters and access to aircraft, but nuclear material or, worse, a nuclear weapon.

In Iraq, America and its foreign allies are continuing, slowly and against resistance, to train Iraqis to look after their own security. Achieving stability will not be easy. Nor will conducting elections that will be accepted by Iraqis and the world as legitimate.

In Afghanistan, the task of creating a modern state still suffers from the initial decision to limit America's role in nation-building. The central government is weak, warlords are strong and poppy production is at record levels. It is unlikely that this effort, any more than those against terrorism or in Iraq, will be completed before Mr Bush leaves office.

The biggest challenges, however, may lie elsewhere, in North Korea and Iran. North Korea reportedly possesses between six and ten nuclear weapons, or at least the fuel to make that many. Iran is farther along on the path to enriching uranium than anyone knew. Either regime, if nuclear-armed, could prove the tipping-point for its region as neighbours decide to follow suit. Either regime might also slip fissile material to terrorists. Mr Bush will have to decide in a hurry what he can tolerate and what he cannot.

Then there is the matter of Israelis and Palestinians. Where there was once a “peace process”, there is now little peace and even less process. Mr Bush will need to figure out what the United States can do to make sure that Ariel Sharon's policy of Israeli disengagement from Gaza does not become Gaza only, and that Gaza does not become a lawless failed state. Failure here would not only make it much more difficult for the United States to promote democratic reform in the Arab world or slow terrorist recruitment, but would damage its reputation everywhere.

Darfur is a humanitarian tragedy that continues to unfold while the world debates whether what is going on is genocide. The question is what more the United States and others are prepared to do, whether to stop the killing or to assist those whose lives have been devastated.

Turning to the major powers, the issue with most potential to cause real harm is China-Taiwan. There, it is getting harder for America to balance its “One China” policy with its security obligations to Taipei. If Taiwan's leaders insist on more trappings of statehood, China may go to war. Coming to Taiwan's defence could well poison America's relations with one of the world's emerging powers, and undermine chances of an acceptable resolution of the North Korea problem; not doing so could raise fundamental questions about America's reliability, and give the impression that China had replaced the United States as the region's dominant force.

Russia is a problem largely of its own making. It is fighting a costly and possibly losing war in Chechnya; alcohol and AIDS are ravaging the population; and democracy is being rolled back as Vladimir Putin takes advantage of high oil prices and fears of terrorism to consolidate his rule. But the United States needs Russian oil, as well as Russia's co-operation to deal with Iran.

One last set of challenges requires a mention. Call them (as Donald Rumsfeld might) the unknown unknowns. The most obvious is another massive terrorist attack that sets America reeling, economically, psychologically and politically. There could be assassinations; imagine the difficulties of building Afghanistan without Hamid Karzai, Pakistan without Pervez Musharraf, or Iraq without not just Iyad Allawi but much of his team. The departure of Fidel Castro, too, though hardly a cause for grief, could lead to instability that some in the United States might find it hard to ignore.



The stretched superpower
Tackling such an array of challenges would be difficult if America was in the best of shape. But it is not. The economy is growing at a reasonable clip, but the foundation of this growth is vulnerable. When Mr Bush ran for president four years ago, the budget was in surplus to the tune of $236 billion; now the annual deficit is more than $400 billion. Calls to reduce growth in federal spending will put pressure on funds available for defence, foreign aid, HIV/AIDS and homeland security.

Add the fact that the current-account deficit is expected to be more than $600 billion this year, or around 5.5% of GDP. All this leaves the economy at the mercy of bankers in Asia and elsewhere who have accumulated massive dollar holdings. As Herb Stein said, that which can't go on forever, won't. A day of reckoning could well come over the next four years. If it does, Alan Greenspan or his successor will have to put up interest rates sharply.

The deficit has grown so much, in part, because of the cost of defence and homeland security. Related to this is the fact that the United States is so active militarily. Some 135,000 troops are in Iraq, another 15,000 in Afghanistan. Reserve call-ups are being extended. The United States would be hard pressed to meet the demands of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. Preventive strikes on a would-be nuclear state are one thing, but it is difficult to see how the United States could take on a full-scale war with even a medium power at this point.

Making matters worse is America's energy dependency. The United States now imports some 12m barrels a day, more than half the oil it consumes. There is no reason to believe that the oil price will soon come down from its $50-a-barrel perch. Besides, the balance between world supply and demand is sufficiently tight that it would not take much disruption in a medium producer (say, Venezuela or Nigeria), not to mention Saudi Arabia, for the price to spike through the roof.

It will not be all doom and gloom, of course. Relations overall with the other big powers—China, Japan, Russia, India—have never been better. In addition, India and Pakistan have moved back from the brink, and links between the two are growing. East Asia is on the economic rebound. South Africa is faring relatively well, as is much of Latin America.

The state of America, too, should be put in perspective. For all its weaknesses, it remains the world's dominant power. Americans support an active world role, despite the costs. Mr Bush could benefit considerably from simply adjusting the tone and style of his diplomacy.



What to focus on
What should rise to the top of Mr Bush's agenda? Let me suggest nine items.

Success in Iraq. This need not require transforming Iraq into a shining city on a hill. It does mean making it a functioning country. Elections will have to be held as scheduled, and the training of Iraqi security forces accelerated. It may be both desirable and necessary to increase American troop levels in the run-up to January's elections, coupling any such increases with an announcement that reductions would follow the vote. America would also be wise to declare publicly its lack of interest in holding on to any bases in Iraq once its troops depart. To be avoided are an arbitrary exit date that would require forces to leave without establishing relative stability, and any appearance that the United States is being driven out of Iraq as it was out of Somalia.

Engage North Korea and Iran. The United States, with others, should make comprehensive offers to both North Korea and Iran. In both cases, the offer should include security assurances and political and economic incentives in exchange for giving up nuclear ambitions. It should also indicate the price to be paid if the world's concerns are not satisfied. Two other good ideas: accelerate efforts to secure Russia's “loose nukes”, and get the nuclear haves to agree that no other country should be able to gain access to nuclear fuel which could be used as, or in, a weapon.

Revive Middle East peace efforts. Making sure that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza goes ahead and leaves something stable in its wake will require American, European and Egyptian collaboration. Ensuring that diplomacy begins rather than ends with Gaza will require America to speak out about where peace efforts should lead, and show greater commitment to getting there. Appointing a senior envoy who clearly enjoys White House backing would be a start.

Prevent a Taiwan crisis. This means continued pressure on Taiwan's leaders not to go too far, along with continued warnings to China's leaders to pursue their goals peacefully. Both should be left in no doubt that they would not benefit from a crisis of their own making.

Drive Doha. A new WTO agreement would be a boon for both America's economy and the world's. America should set an example by eliminating all its remaining subsidies, quotas and tariffs.

Help Darfur. America should make intelligence, logistics, training and equipment available to the African Union, and push for targeted sanctions against Sudan's leaders.

Repair transatlantic ties. Further continental drifting apart will serve neither America's nor Europe's interests. Alas, there is no quick fix available. Europeans (read French and Germans or, better yet, NATO) must find some way to help meaningfully in Iraq; a failure there would do them as little good as it would the rest of the civilised world.

Stay the course on terrorism. Continue to go after terrorists and frustrate their recruitment efforts, but also keep investing in homeland security. Lowering America's profile in Iraq will help, as will raising it on the Palestinian issue. The United States should also stick with efforts to promote political, economic and education reform in the Arab world.

Get your house in order. The United States will not remain a great power for long if the economic foundation of its power erodes. It must rein in domestic spending, including tackling entitlements. America must also develop a serious and responsible energy policy. The only debate needed is over the right mix of mandated efficiency improvements, investment in alternative fuels and (get the children out of the room) new taxes.

All these challenges will add up to a more restrained America. New wars of choice are less likely; Mr Bush will have his hands full. Many around the world will no doubt welcome this. But they should be careful what they wish for. The world is a very dangerous place and, unlike the economic marketplace, there is no invisible hand making sure all turns out for the best. As Mr Bush well knows, only the United States can fulfil this role.


Richard Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. His next book, “The Opportunity”, will be published in the spring

Globalization's Missing Middle

In the new global economy, rich and poor nations are doing fine. It is those like the countries of Latin America in the middle that are struggling

By Geoffrey Garrett


It is sometimes hard to remember that the debate over globalization dominated world politics from the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s until September 11, 2001. On one side of the discussion stand the boosters of globalization, represented by the "Washington consensus" among the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury, as well as the globetrotting pilgrims to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. They assert that the integration of global markets is not only good for them, it is also the best way to enrich and empower the world's have-nots.

Critics of globalism — populist politicians, labor leaders, environmentalists and other activists — come together wherever and whenever the Washington consensus meets, most notoriously during the "battle in Seattle" at the meeting of the World Trade Organization in December 1999. For them, globalization only lines the pockets of the global elite at the expense of working people, developing countries and the planet.

The debate over the spoils of economic globalization has taken on new meaning since September 11. President Bush made his views clear on the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks: "Poverty, corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies. . . . Free trade and free markets have proved their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty, so the United States is working . . . to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity." But the criticisms continue, with the Democratic candidate for president lamenting the "offshoring" of not only manufacturing but also call centers and other services during America's "jobless" recovery.

Is the president right that "a world that trades in freedom" is one that also "grows in prosperity"? My answer is yes — and no. I believe that there are three discrete worlds of globalization, and each has important but different implications for the future course of global politics.

Free trade and free capital movement have been good for economic growth in the U.S. and other rich nations. Globalization has allowed these countries to exploit the growing "knowledge economy" (in which workers' education and skills matter most to the quality of products) while importing low-cost standardized goods and services from the developing world. But since not everyone is equipped to participate in the knowledge economy, the gap between rich and poor in the West continues to expand — with workers' education and skills being more important to their life chances than ever before.

In the U.S. and other rich countries, the drumbeat of globalization goes on — because it is always possible to compensate the losers so long as the aggregate benefits are big enough, and they are; and because it is not clear whether the genie of globalization could be put back in the bottle even if governments wanted to do so. But whenever the economy stagnates, globalization will incur the ire of the disaffected and politicians will be sorely tempted to court them with populist rhetoric and actions. This is nothing new, but handling the social dislocations associated with the transition to the knowledge economy will remain a major challenge for politicians in rich countries for decades to come.

Poor countries that have cut their tariffs more have grown faster, with liberalized trade bringing substantial benefits to one-time subsistence farmers who now work in industry, just as the economics textbooks wrote it up. This is the second world of globalization, comprising the roughly half of humanity that lives in countries with per-capita incomes of less than $1,000 a year — including most of sub-Saharan Africa as well as China and India. Poor countries have not benefited much from, and may have been hurt by, global "footloose finance," and legitimate questions about child labor and working conditions remain. Nonetheless, global trade — as manifest in manufacturing "sweatshops" and "offshored" services — really does seem to be creating a path out of poverty for many of the world's poorest people.

The bulk of people in poor countries still work on the land, yet today manufacturing and service exports are far more important to economic growth in poor countries than agricultural ones. The real stakes for these countries is making sure that the rapid diffusion of technology, which has made it possible for poorer societies to catch up to richer ones for centuries, continues. This will be far from easy, however, given the high stakes attached to protecting intellectual property in wealthy countries.

The benefits of free trade, however, just have not materialized for middle-income countries (with per-capita incomes between $1,000 and $10,000). Notwithstanding the promises made by the Washington consensus and the rhetoric of reformist governments, tariff reductions and freer finance have only been accompanied by stagnant growth and rising inequality — particularly in Latin America, but in the post-communist countries as well. This is globalization's missing middle.

Liberalization's supporters respond to the mismatch between the hype and the reality of globalization in middle-income countries with a plea for patience. But this "just wait" optimism belies the fact that global markets have placed the middle-income world in a no-win trap from which it will be hard to escape. These economies cannot hope to compete today with the West; their basic strategy has been to try instead to compete with the Chinas of the world. This has ended up only hurting workers whose wages have been cut, but not by the enormous magnitudes that would be necessary to make the middle-income countries competitive in mass-produced manufacturing and standardized services.

Teching-up rather than dumbing-down is clearly a better long-term strategy for these countries. But it will take decades to reap the benefits — and the political costs of globalization's failings are already large and mounting. The European Union's response has been to open itself to new members from central and eastern Europe.

But populist backlashes against globalization — and America — are increasingly widespread in Mexico and other Latin American nations. If the U.S. wants to change political and economic realities south of the border, it cannot simply propose more free-trade agreements. The U.S. must recognize that these countries can't hope to compete in the knowledge economy until education levels, physical infrastructure and property rights more closely resemble those in the Western world. The role for "smart" development assistance, from the U.S. and the international financial institutions, should be clear. But the U.S. will also have to use soft power to help heal the wounds in countries that have been burned before by unfulfilled promises about the benefits of globalization.

This is today's world of economic integration. The benefits of globalization are more than merely theoretical, but on the ground they have also been considerably less than was promised. The losers — middle-income countries and poor people in the West — are caught in the crossfire between the stringent demands for success in the knowledge economy and the harsh realities of competing against countries where people will work for much less while still doing a good job.
Improving the lot of the current losers from globalization remains a critical global challenge in terms of not only economic justice, but of political stability as well. The 1990s refrain, championed by the United States, that more markets will ultimately do the job seems increasingly unrealistic, and, for many, disingenuous. Global markets are great for expanding the pie, but the negative fallout of concentrated losses and uncertainty cannot be ignored. Squaring this globalization circle will no doubt be hard, but the stakes could scarcely be higher.

Geoffrey Garrett is vice provost and dean of the UCLA International Institute, and director of the Burkle Center for International Relations.

The full study on which this article is based can be found at www.international.ucla.edu.

Transcript of the Candidates' First Debate in the Presidential Campaign

Siempre es bueno saber que se discute en una campaña presidencial en la mayor economía del mundo... (Mejor aún verlo en vivo y en directo por TV)

Following is a transcript of the presidential debate last night in Coral Gables, Fla., between President Bush and Senator John Kerry, as recorded by The New York Times. The moderator was Jim Lehrer of the Public Broadcasting Service.

The New York Times > Washington > Campaign 2004 > Transcript of the Candidates' First Debate in the Presidential Campaign

It's the dishonesty, stupid!

The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: The Dishonesty Thing

By PAUL KRUGMAN

It's the dishonesty, stupid. The real issue in the National Guard story isn't what George W. Bush did three decades ago. It's the recent pattern of lies: his assertions that he fulfilled his obligations when he obviously didn't, the White House's repeated claims that it had released all of the relevant documents when it hadn't.

It's the same pattern of dishonesty, this time involving personal matters that the public can easily understand, that some of us have long seen on policy issues, from global warming to the war in Iraq. On budget matters, which is where I came in, serious analysts now take administration dishonesty for granted.

It wasn't always that way. Three years ago, those of us who accused the administration of cooking the budget books were ourselves accused, by moderates as well as by Bush loyalists, of being "shrill." These days the coalition of the shrill has widened to include almost every independent budget expert.

For example, back in February the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities accused the Bush administration of, in effect, playing three-card monte with budget forecasts. It pointed out that the administration's deficit forecast was far above those of independent analysts, and suggested that this exaggeration was deliberate.

"Overstating the 2004 deficit," the center wrote, "could allow the president to announce significant 'progress' on the deficit in late October - shortly before Election Day - when the Treasury Department announces the final figures."

Was this a wild accusation from a liberal think tank? No, it's conventional wisdom among experts. Two months ago Stanley Collender, a respected nonpartisan analyst, warned: "At some point over the next few weeks, the Office of Management and Budget will release the administration's midsession budget review and try to convince everyone the federal deficit is falling. Don't believe them."

He went on to echo the center's analysis. The administration's standard procedure, he said, is to initially issue an unrealistically high deficit forecast, which is "politically motivated or just plain bad." Then, when the actual number comes in below the forecast, officials declare that the deficit is falling, even though it's higher than the previous year's deficit.

Goldman Sachs says the same. Last month one of its analysts wrote that "the Office of Management and Budget has perfected the art of underpromising and overperforming in terms of its near-term budget deficit forecasts. This creates the impression that the deficit is narrowing when, in fact, it will be up sharply."

In other words, many reputable analysts think that the Bush administration routinely fakes even its short-term budget forecasts for the purposes of political spin. And the fakery in its long-term forecasts is much worse.

The administration claims to have a plan to cut the deficit in half over the next five years. But even Bruce Bartlett, a longtime tax-cut advocate, points out that "projections showing deficits falling assume that Bush's tax cuts expire on schedule." But Mr. Bush wants those tax cuts made permanent. That is, the administration has a "plan" to reduce the deficit that depends on Congress's not passing its own legislation.

Sounding definitely shrill, Mr. Bartlett says that "anyone who thinks we can overcome our fiscal mess without higher taxes is in denial." Far from backing down on his tax cuts, however, Mr. Bush is proposing to push the budget much deeper into the red with privatization programs that purport to offer something for nothing.

As Newsweek's Allan Sloan writes, "The president didn't exactly burden us with details about paying for all this. It's great marketing: show your audience the goodies but not the price tag. It's like going to the supermarket, picking out your stuff and taking it home without stopping at the checkout line to pay. The bill? That will come later."

Longtime readers will remember that that's exactly what I said, shrilly, about Mr. Bush's proposals during the 2000 campaign. Once again, he's running on the claim that 2 - 1 = 4.

So what's the real plan? Some not usually shrill people think that Mr. Bush will simply refuse to face reality until it comes crashing in: Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, says there's a 75 percent chance of a financial crisis in the next five years.

Nobody knows what Mr. Bush would really do about taxes and spending in a second term. What we do know is that on this, as on many matters, he won't tell the truth.

Descentralization in France

The price of unexpected success


The third reform, guillotined through parliament this week to howls of protest from the opposition Socialist Party—a move which in itself triggered the vote of confidence—decentralises a bit of the civil service. The law devolves certain responsibilities, including national roads, most ports and airports, certain social-housing funds and training schemes, and technical secondary-school employees and caretakers. Some 130,000 civil servants will be transferred to local authorities. The government says it wants to rationalise a labyrinthine public service. It also calculates that it will be less difficult to shed bureaucratic jobs in future if they are not all centrally based. ...

Por que no tomar el mismo camino en la Argentina??...hacia un FEDERALISMO VERDADERO

The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: Timeout for Imagination

The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: Timeout for Imagination

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

This is my last column for three months. I'm taking a sabbatical to finish a book about geopolitics, called "The World Is Flat." It is not easy to take a timeout right now. But I want to step back and construct a better framework for myself to explain what's going on out there. Here's a few of the headlines I'd like to read while I'm gone.

Iraq's New Government Quashes Rebellion in Sunni Areas — Without the Help of U.S. Troops — Thanks to Intelligence Provided by Iraqis Themselves. I believe the main reason the Abu Ghraib prison scandal happened was because U.S. forces in Iraq were facing an uprising and had no intelligence. Too few Iraqis viewed us as legitimate or able to protect them, so they did not want to, or dare to, come forward with actionable intelligence about who was attacking us. As a result, some U.S. forces tried to beat it out of them. The big question I have going forward in Iraq is this: Now that a new, decent and diverse Iraqi government will have sovereignty, will Iraqis, particularly from the Sunni Triangle, come forward with the intelligence needed for Iraq's fledgling army to break the violent opposition in Iraq, largely on its own — that is, with the help of the Iraqi people and not us? If you see that happening, it means that enough Iraqi Sunnis are ready to sign on to the new Iraq. If you don't see that, it means that the only way the rebellion can be quashed is by heavy-handed tactics, which, if they come from U.S. forces, will only embarrass the new Iraqi government and if they come from the new Iraqi Army could trigger civil war. The Islamist opposition forces in Iraq are truly depraved. They will do anything to make sure America fails, including sacrificing all of Iraq. In the end, only Iraqis can root them out.

President Bush Stuns Electorate — Does His Own Version of Nixon to China and Announces Joint Chinese-American Crash Program for Developing Alternative Energies. Roughly 30,000 new cars merge onto the roads in Beijing every single month. Every day, the newspaper headlines in China are about energy shortages, blackouts and brownouts. U.S. officials estimate that 24 out of China's 31 provinces are now experiencing power shortages. China's foreign policy today consists of two things — Taiwan and searching for oil. China's oil imports jumped last year alone by 30 percent. This is not a healthy situation. Environmentally speaking, in 10 days in Beijing I saw blue sky once. The other days were a gray, polluted haze. Developmentally, China's growth is soon going to be restrained, if it isn't already, by a sheer shortage of energy. Strategically, China and America could soon find themselves in a dangerous head-to-head competition for fuel.

If there was ever a time for big imagination, it is now. What we need is for President Bush to surprise himself and the world and propose a grand China-U.S. Manhattan Project — a crash program to jointly develop clean alternative energies, bringing together China's best scientists and its ability to force pilot projects, with America's best brains, technology and money. "When it comes to renewable technology and sustainable energy, China could be the laboratory of the world — not just the workshop of the world," said Scott Roberts, Cambridge Energy Research Associates analyst in China. Why not?

Bush Administration Calls an End to the "War on Terrorism." No, I haven't taken leave of my senses on the way out the door. I realize that we have enemies and they need to be confronted. But I do not want this to be all that America is about in the world anymore, and that is what has happened under this administration. I don't want the rest of my career to be about an America that exports fear, not hope, and ends up importing everyone else's fears as a result. I don't want it to be about explaining to young Chinese why my government can't give them student visas anymore. I don't want it to be about visiting U.S. Embassies around the world and finding them so isolated behind barbed wire, they might as well not be there at all. Defeating "them" has begun to define "us" in too many ways.

America is so much more than just "Anti-Al-Qaeda Inc." — but our whole identity in the world, and too many aspects of our way of life, are getting contorted around that mission. If we're really having a relevant presidential campaign, I'll come back and find the candidates debating, not who is the "toughest" guy — the jungle is full of them — but who can be the toughest guy while preserving the best of what we had and the best of who we are.

The European Constitution

Finally, a constitution. Now the hard part

IT WON'T exactly be remembered as Europe’s “Philadelphia moment” but they got the job done in the end. Late on Friday June 18th, the leaders of the European Union’s 25 member countries finally agreed on the text of a constitution for the EU. The single document (strictly speaking, a constitutional treaty) will replace the series of treaties which have governed the EU to this point, and which were illegibly complex.

The new constitution is not exactly pretty itself—it runs over 200 pages, and is far from the elegant document that its champions hoped would reconnect the EU’s apathetic voters with the European project. But for now, at least, there is agreement, and a sigh of relief, after public rowing between Jacques Chirac, France’s president, and Tony Blair, the British prime minister. After the summit, Mr Blair hailed the deal as a success: “A new Europe is taking shape—a Europe where Britain can build alliances and feel at home,” he declared. Germany’s chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was more circumspect: “I believe one can say that, all in all, it is legitimate to be pleased.”

go to article from The Economist
Background EU Constitution

IMF: Reform, Downsize, or Abolish

IMF: Reform, Downsize, or Abolish

The Meltzer report (brillante) sugiere que el FMI deberia reducirse a un mero papel de prestamista de ultima instancia ante posibles crisis de liquidez en los paises, eliminado a su vez el poder del FMI de imponer condiciones en paises en desarrollo a cambio de asistencias de largo plazo, y permitiendo que cada pais adopte politicas propias dentro de un cierto marco preestablecido.

Luego de que este reporte (financiado por el congreso americano)fuera presentado (marzo 200), el secretario del tesoro Lawrence Summers puso el grito en el cielo denunciando que tal accion "debilitaria profundamente la capacidad del FMI y por ende la de las instituciones financieras internacionales para promover los intereses centrales de Estados Unidos" (sic) y defiende al FMI como "entre los mas efectivos y costo-eficientes medios disponibles para promover las prioridades norteamericanas en el mundo" (sic)

Para ser claro: el FMI tiene que seguir siendo una herramienta politica de USA !!!

The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000

The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000
By Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, Egor Kraev and Judy Chen

It is commonly accepted that the increased opening to international trade and financial flows that has occurred in the vast majority of countries in the world has been an overall success. Even critics of globalization have generally accepted that the reforms of the last two decades, in low to middle-income countries, have boosted economic growth rates. They have argued that this growth has left many people behind, and has often been at the expense of the natural environment.

This paper looks at the major economic and social indicators for all countries for which data are available, and compares the last 20 years of globalization (1980-2000) with the previous 20 years (1960-1980). These indicators include: the growth of income per person, life expectancy, mortality among infants, children, and adults, literacy, and education.

For economic growth and almost all of the other indicators, the last 20 years have shown a very clear decline in progress as compared with the previous two decades. For each indicator, countries were divided into five roughly equal groups, according to what level the countries had achieved by the start of the period (1960 or 1980). Among the findings:

Growth: The fall in economic growth rates was most pronounced and across the board for all groups or countries. The poorest group went from a per capita GDP growth rate of 1.9 percent annually in 1960-80, to a decline of 0.5 percent per year (1980-2000). For the middle group (which includes mostly poor countries), there was a sharp decline from an annual per capita growth rate of 3.6 percent to just less than 1 percent. Over a 20-year period, this represents the difference between doubling income per person, versus increasing it by just 21 percent. The other groups also showed substantial declines in growth rates.

Life Expectancy: Progress in life expectancy was also reduced for 4 out of the 5 groups of countries, with the exception of the highest group (life expectancy 69-76 years). The sharpest slowdown was in the second to worst group (life expectancy between 44-53 years). Reduced progress in life expectancy and other health outcomes cannot be explained by the AIDS pandemic.

Infant and Child Mortality: Progress in reducing infant mortality was also considerably slower during the period of globalization (1980-1998) than over the previous two decades. The biggest declines in progress were for the middle to worst performing groups. Progress in reducing child mortality (under 5) was also slower for the middle to worst performing groups of countries.

Education and literacy: Progress in education also slowed during the period of globalization. The rate of growth of primary, secondary, and tertiary (post-secondary) school enrollment was slower for most groups of countries. There are some exceptions, but these tend to be concentrated among the better performing groups of countries. By almost every measure of education, including literacy rates, the middle and poorer performing groups saw less rapid progress in the period of globalization than in the prior two decades. The rate of growth of public spending on education, as a share of GDP, also slowed across all groups of countries.

keep reading... The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000

La excusa del proteccionismo agricola

Centro de Estudios Publicos por Mario Tejeiro

El proteccionismo agrícola de los países desarrollados es una gran injusticia contra la cual debemos luchar los países emergentes. Pero es también una excusa inaceptable para mantener nuestro proteccionismo industrial. La pregunta relevante es qué hacer si el proteccionismo agrícola (de los países desarrollados) se confirma como inamovible. El punto es que la continuidad de nuestro proteccionismo industrial es una represalia irrelevante contra los países desarrollados, pero mientras tanto es una herramienta que atenta contra nuestro crecimiento exportador. La solución al dilema consiste en abrirnos al comercio en forma inmediata y unilateral y reservarnos otros instrumentos para negociar la apertura de los mercados de los países industriales. En las antípodas de esta posición, el gobierno ha entregado nuestras negociaciones comerciales a los intereses de nuestro capitalismo corporativo “productivo”.

El fracaso de Cancún

El fracaso de la reunión de Cancún de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) obedeció principalmente al enfrentamiento por la política agrícola de los países industriales, que estos pretenden mantener al margen de las negociaciones de una nueva ronda multilateral. El proteccionismo agrícola es de una enorme injusticia hacia los países en desarrollo que tienen poblaciones rurales sumergidas en la pobreza. Pero la reticencia a remover el proteccionismo agrícola es tan fuerte, que la opción para los países emergentes da la impresión que será blanco o negro: o negocian una apertura multilateral al margen del proteccionismo agrícola o no hay negociación posible. En medio de la intransigencia europea y la posición común de los países en desarrollo, el Secretario de Comercio americano, Robert Zoellick, ha declarado que si las negociaciones multilaterales fracasan, Estados Unidos va a continuar promoviendo esfuerzos bilaterales y regionales de libre comercio (como el ALCA). En este contexto, ¿Cuál es nuestra política comercial apropiada?. ¿Aprovechamos la excusa del proteccionismo agrícola para sumarnos al mundo subdesarrollado más radical en el rechazo a cualquier apertura comercial (pues estamos convencidos que nuestra mejor estrategia es favorecer el desarrollo de una burguesía industrial nacional)?. O, por el contrario, promovemos una actitud constructiva, negociando hasta donde sea posible la apertura de los mercados agrícolas, pero con el convencimiento íntimo que tenemos que aprovechar las mejores oportunidades comerciales posibles dentro del mundo globalizado?. Si las negociaciones multilaterales fracasan, ¿qué hacemos frente a iniciativas bilaterales como el ALCA?

El proteccionismo agrícola como excusa

A partir de 1945 Argentina cerró decididamente su economía, optando por un (nefasto) modelo de crecimiento a través de la distribución de ingresos y la sustitución de importaciones. ¿Fue esta política motivada por una represalia al proteccionismo agrícola europeo?. De ninguna manera, el proteccionismo agrícola no existía. Por el contrario, una Europa desvastada por la guerra dependía como nunca del abastecimiento alimentario de nuestro país. Las razones fundamentales del cambio fueron políticas e ideológicas. El populismo se instaló en la política. El reflejo económico fueron las medidas distribucionistas y proteccionistas. El objetivo fundamental del distribucionismo populista fue extraer las rentas de la “oligarquía agropecuaria”, tomando el Estado el control monopólico de la exportación y pagándole al productor precios que eran una fracción del precio internacional. Esta política le permitió al Estado hacerse de enormes recursos para financiar su expansión, pero también abarató el costo de alimentación para las grandes masas urbanas, las que quedaron así con mayor poder adquisitivo para adquirir bienes industriales. La industria nacional estaba en el paraíso. Con un mercado interno en expansión y prohibición de importaciones, tenía su negocio absolutamente asegurado.

El proteccionismo agrícola de los países industriales llegó con posterioridad, a partir de 1960 y su importancia creciente provocó un deterioro de los precios agropecuarios que contribuyó significativamente a la decadencia Argentina y al agotamiento del modelo de sustitución de importaciones. El Estado se quedó sin las rentas de la exportación agropecuaria, debiendo recurrir a déficits que condujeron a la hiperinflación primero y luego al default. La pérdida de valor de las exportaciones y las crisis financieras hicieron insostenibles los atrasos cambiarios que (protección arancelaria mediante) soportaban salarios de alto poder adquisitivo e insumos baratos para la industria nacional.

Quienes no quieren la apertura comercial tienen en el proteccionismo agrícola una excusa pública perfecta. Pero justificar el proteccionismo industrial en función del proteccionismo agrícola es falaz, cuando no hipócrita. La rentabilidad del campo ha sido siempre vista como una cuestión de “oligarcas llorones y angurrientos”, aún hoy cuando el código civil ya ha producido una “reforma agraria” al atomizar las explotaciones y que la rentabilidad del campo es muy baja. El campo recibe un tercio del precio que reciben los productores de países industriales. Pero esto parece no ser suficiente castigo y entonces recurrimos a otros dos instrumentos: uno, permanente, que es la protección arancelaria de la industria, que aumenta los costos de la producción agropecuaria y disminuye el estándar de vida de toda la población rural. El otro, transitorio, son los derechos de exportación, que son el instrumento de “justicia distributiva” de corto plazo, utilizados cada vez que los precios de los alimentos amenazan dispararse por crisis cambiarias o por subas transitorias en los precios internacionales.

¿Qué es lo que justifica que, recibiendo el campo un tercio de lo que reciben los productores de países industriales, además se los castigue directamente con derechos de exportación e indirectamente con la protección arancelaria a la industria?. Seguramente no es el amor por el libre comercio de nuestra dirigencia, sino son sus intereses políticos asociados al distribucionismo y los intereses económicos de la industria del mercado interno. En estas circunstancias cabe preguntarse qué pasaría si los países desarrollados se avinieran a eliminar de golpe el proteccionismo agropecuario. Los precios internacionales del agro aumentarían significativamente y el aumento de ingresos de exportación apreciaría el tipo de cambio de una manera importante. Con una fuerte apreciación cambiaria, ¿nuestras dirigencias política e industrial estarían entonces dispuestas a aceptar una liberación de las importaciones?. Todo lo contrario, la oposición a la apertura sería seguramente mucho mayor de lo que es hoy, cuando tenemos un elevado tipo real de cambio. El proteccionismo agrícola es entonces una mera excusa para defender las prebendas proteccionistas que se usufructúan a costas del bienestar general.

Paradójicamente, a la industria local le convendría el mantenimiento del proteccionismo agrícola. Si este desapareciera, Argentina volvería a “sufrir” un problema de apreciación cambiaria similar al producido en las etapas del endeudamiento externo fácil (con la agravante diferencia que en este caso el fenómeno de apreciación cambiaria sería permanente y sostenible). Pero si el proteccionismo agrícola continuara (como probablemente ocurrirá), la pregunta es: ¿para qué abrir unilateralmente nuestra economía?. ¿Acaso no estaríamos “regalando mercados” a cambio de nada?. Absolutamente no. Si no nos endeudamos, para importar más deberemos exportar más. Si no podemos exportar más agro, exportaremos más industria y servicios. Los mercados industriales que pudiéramos “regalar” equivaldrán a los mercados industriales que “nos regalen” y en el intercambio ganaremos por mayor eficiencia productiva y menores precios de consumo. La Argentina regaló mercados sólo cuando se endeudó irresponsablemente, pues sólo ello permitió importar más de lo que exportábamos. Pero esas políticas no deben (y por mucho tiempo, no podrán) repetirse, ya que cualquier política comercial beneficiosa para el país tiene que ir acompañada de un tipo de cambio que no sea artificialmente apreciado por políticas públicas irresponsables.

Los beneficios de la apertura unilateral

Los beneficios de una apertura unilateral “a la chilena” (sin derechos de exportación y con aranceles de importación mínimos y uniformes) son múltiples. En primer lugar, disminuiría la descomunal discriminación en contra del sector agropecuario, ya suficientemente afectado por los precios internacionales resultantes del proteccionismo agropecuario. En segundo lugar eliminaríamos “el sesgo antiexportador” que afecta a todas las exportaciones industriales y de servicios. Al eliminar la protección arancelaria, el tipo de cambio tendría un mayor nivel que si continuamos con mercados protegidos y esto cambiaría radicalmente los incentivos dentro del sector industrial, beneficiando a los sectores intensivos en mano de obra y con potencial exportador en desmedro de los sectores industriales orientados al mercado interno (particularmente los más capital intensivos). Las industrias de manufacturas de origen agropecuario deberían ser claras ganadoras, mientras que los sectores protegidos deberían transformarse para adaptarse a sus verdaderas ventajas comparativas o desaparecer. Las mejoras de eficiencia dentro del sector industrial son de una gran potencialidad, porque permitirían el acceso a mercados de exportación muy vastos. La adhesión a acuerdos de libre comercio como el ALCA sería un complemento insoslayable, pues garantizarían el acceso a los mercados de países desarrollados, aspecto que es esencial para motivar inversiones de largo plazo orientadas a la exportación. En tercer lugar, terminaríamos con el capitalismo prebendario que se garantiza beneficios extraordinarios con protecciones estatales artificiales, creando así las bases para un capitalismo competitivo que beneficie a todos.

Conclusión

El proteccionismo agrícola nos perjudica como país y es necesario pelear por su desaparición. Pero no se sostiene mantener nuestro proteccionismo industrial porque exista proteccionismo agrícola. La continuidad de nuestro proteccionismo industrial es una represalia irrelevante para los países industriales. Sus intereses se satisfacen de todas maneras vendiéndonos bienes de capital de alta tecnología (que desgravamos) e instalándose como inversores directos en sectores protegidos, donde pueden usufructuar beneficios extraordinarios. Los principales perjudicados por el proteccionismo industrial somos nosotros mismos: se trata de un instrumento que induce un capitalismo concentrado y prebendario y atenta contra las posibilidades de un crecimiento alto y sostenible a través de las exportaciones.

Entonces, ¿qué hacemos?. En la negociación multilateral Argentina debe acompañar a los países en desarrollo en una posición firme, pero en última instancia negociadora, a favor de una reducción más agresiva del proteccionismo agrícola. Pero debe quedar en claro que no nos conviene mantener una política industrial proteccionista (como el arancel común del Mercosur) durante los muchos años que puede demorar llegar al libre comercio vía negociaciones multilaterales. Mientras tanto el camino pasa por decidirnos rápidamente a una apertura unilateral “a la chilena”, avanzar en todos los acuerdos bilaterales posibles y reservarnos otros instrumentos (como el tratamiento a los inversores extranjeros) para negociar la apertura de los mercados a nuestras exportaciones. No se trata de una propuesta teórica (con suficiente respaldo, por cierto) sino una propuesta avalada por el éxito económico de países como Chile que se decidieron (aún en un mundo de un comercio internacional muy imperfecto y hasta injusto) por un crecimiento a través del comercio libre.

En las antípodas de esta posición, el canciller Bielsa se jacta de una nueva política de negociaciones comerciales internacionales en la que “nunca antes como en esta oportunidad, el sector empresario se involucró en el diseño y en la ejecución de la estrategia para las negociaciones comerciales argentinas”. El resultado ha sido una posición que nos asegure “…que cualquier concesión (reducción tarifaria) no perforará los aranceles que efectivamente aplicamos en la actualidad. De hecho, ninguna propuesta efectuada por nuestro país erosiona la protección efectiva que hoy posee la industria, y así, cualquier resultado se traducirá en ganancias netas para nuestro país (sic)”. Está bien claro. Hemos entregado nuestra política comercial externa a los intereses proteccionistas internos, lo que augura el rechazo a iniciativas de integración económica multilateral o regional (ALCA). Parece que ahora es el turno del corporativismo “productivo” y el interés general, tan declamado por el gobierno, seguirá esperando.

El mortal proteccionismo agrícola europeo

en INFOBAE por Richard Rahn

Según el recién publicado informe "Las Barreras Comerciales de la Unión Europea son Mortales", del Centro para la Nueva Europa (CNE), "una persona muere cada 13 segundos en el mundo -principalmente en Africa- porque Europa no hace lo que dice con respecto al intercambio comercial".

Hace unas semanas, se reunieron los ministros de comercio de 146 países en Cancún bajo los auspicios de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) para tratar varios asuntos, especialmente la agricultura. Un mes antes, 16 países -incluyendo a China, Brasil y la India- le pidieron a la OMC que obligara a los países ricos a reducir sus aranceles y subsidios agrícolas.

La Unión Europea, Estados Unidos, Japón y Canadá representan alrededor de 75% de la producción mundial y son los mercados más grandes de exportaciones de los países pobres. El CNE mantiene, sin embargo, que "mientras esas naciones hablan todo el tiempo de liberalizar el comercio internacional, han actuado despiadadamente al mantener cerrados sus mercados internos a las exportaciones agrícolas y textiles de los países más pobres".

La UE destruye las ventajas comparativas de los países pobres en alimentos y textiles, principalmente por medio de altos aranceles que promedian 20% y alcanzan hasta 250 por ciento. Por ejemplo, el arancel europeo para un pollo boliviano es 46% y para el jugo de naranja, 34 por ciento. Luego, la UE mantiene subsidios agrícolas masivos, llamados Política Agrícola Común, por un total de u$s41.000 millones al año, o sea, 14.000 dólares anuales por cada agricultor europeo.

Tales subsidios impiden que los campesinos no europeos puedan competir ante los precios artificialmente bajos que resultan del subsidio. Esos subsidios también provocan inmensos excedentes agrícolas, de los cuales los europeos se deshacen volcándolos en el mercado internacional, deprimiendo deslealmente los precios y poniendo en peligro la supervivencia de los campesinos no subsidiados de los países en desarrollo. Una de esas locuras es el hecho de que la UE gasta u$s3.000 al año subsidiando el azúcar de remolacha y, al mismo tiempo, le fija un alto arancel a la muy barata azúcar de caña de los países pobres.

Aunque los Estados Unidos y otros países subsidian también a sus agricultores, la UE es quien más daño hace al concentrar alrededor de un tercio del proteccionismo mundial. El CNE calcula que esas políticas de la UE causan la muerte de 6.600 personas al día, 275 cada hora.

Los economistas saben desde hace más de 200 años que el libre comercio beneficia a todos y no se trata de un juego suma cero. Es, además, irónico que el libre comercio no sólo beneficiaría al mundo en desarrollo sino también a la UE, a los Estados Unidos y al resto de los países que subsidian su agricultura. Como bien lo explican los autores del informe del CNE, "las políticas agrícolas de la UE perjudican a los campesinos del mundo en desarrollo. Dañan a los consumidores en Europa al aumentar los precios de los alimentos. Afectan a los productores europeos no-agrícolas al desviar ingresos que en circunstancias normales no se gastarían en alimentos... Los grandes beneficiarios son las grandes empresas agrícolas, además de los políticos y burócratas que supervisan todo el sistema". Y lo mismo se puede aplicar a los Estados Unidos.

No nos debe sorprender esa hipocresía política europea. Después de todo, son los mismos políticos que inventaron el destructivo concepto de "la dañina competencia en impuestos", que es otra forma de perjudicar a los demás países desarrollados y subdesarrollados. La reducción de la competencia en impuestos significa mayores impuestos al capital y, por consiguiente, menos inversiones, más desempleo, caída del nivel de vida y mayores impuestos sobre las herencias.

El terrorista es aquel que por su mente enferma mata a civiles inocentes. ¿Cómo debemos llamar a los políticos que fomentan el proteccionismo y quieren destruir la competencia en los impuestos, todo lo cual también mata a muchísima gente, especialmente a niños inocentes?

Harvesting Poverty - The New York Times

Harvesting Poverty

Una colección de editoriales y opiniones sobre FREE TRADE. El fracaso de Cancún, free trade no es para la agricultura, sólo para los automóviles y play stations, y muchos otros interesantes artículos

The Times's editorial page is focusing on the damaging impact that American, European and Japanese agricultural subsidies and trade barriers have on farmers in developing nations. The project is being led by editorial writer Andrés Martinez, who is travelling to Asia, Africa, Europe and South America this summer to research the issue.